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INTRODUCTION 
The Con~ri[Urion I provides rhat when organs of srate comraC[ for goods or 
services, they must comply wirh, inter alla, the following principles, fairness, 
compeliliveness and cosr-effectlveness,' In brief, rhis means tha[ organs 
of state should make u~e or' compeLition when procuring goods or ser-
vices Orgdns of ~late should '~hop around' and aLlracL the maximum 
nurnbcr of contractors \\'ho will participale In such competition An organ 
of Sla[e should lhen choose lO conLract with whoever offers the best deal. 
In othcr words Lhe Jim IS lO cnsurc the attainment or' the best value for 
money - public moncy should be speTH in an effectivc and etliClenL man-
ner, Those who participatc in governmenL procuremem procedures 
should also be [reatcd fairly ,md even-handedly; there should be no bias in 
Lhe award of comraClS, 
I n many Instances, depcndlng on (hc nalure and value of a particular 
conlract, organs or statc makc use of a G:ill for tenders when procuring 
goods or scrviccs: thc public is Invi[cd (0 tcnder for thc proVIsion of goods 
or .services," Thcre are, howcvcr. certain tcnderers or contractors who 
may be excluded from panlclpatlon, Lcgislation providcs that an organ or 
state may (I) disregard or reject a comractor's tender for the non-payment 
of taxes and/or (2) debar a comranor from fwure government contraCl 
awards for the failure (0 render sdli~faclory contractual performancc In the 
past or on the ground of fraud or corrup[ion, In this articlc. i[ will bc argued 
[ha[ some of [he leglslatlve provisions (dealing with the reJec(Jon of ten-
ders and the debarmem of conuactors) have [he potential to unduly exclude 
• l'IliS drlJell" J~ /)ds(,d Oil (('nclill ~("L'lIUl\" ul lile rllllll()r',> lIllPlllJlJ"lled do( lurrll tlll:SI.'> !he 
le.'ju{ re!Ju{o[l(J11 o/.'JtJl'c>rnnwnl /Jrrj('ureI7WI1{ In SOlllh IVnm (IJ[IIVer~llY 01 the Wt~"tt'rll 
CilPl~, 2()U~)l 
I~ Pro(' LLB LLM ILl) (llW() 'Ilil' I'll\dlllldl <'llPPOr[ 01 lilt" [k~t:arc!t I)t:VellJIJrlH;[)r Onil(-
ul 11ll: lIlllV(T'>iry oj llw W,'''lt'l'Il Capt: I~ gratefully rIlhllo'Wledged, I dIll alsu Inrkl)[ed 10 
Supe WIIII(lm~, d vl'>lliJlg lullll'('r IrlJlll rhl' llfllv('r"ity i,l N(JIII[lgllcl.III'~ PIlIlIIC Pr'uuHe-
111,111 Ikst"Mcil GrullV wllo W'lll'rOllsly provided III(' Willi Illdlnidl,<, IllIcl.VdlldIJI(' dlld IHI-
kllowli Iu lIle til Ille till II' of WrJlilig tJlIS arurle, and IJyj(llOllt which ltll.'> articl(; would 1](; 
of cl. IrIIJ( II pl)(lrr'r qlldlllY 
I CUIl~[lIll(JUIl ut li,t. I'kpuiliit" 01 SOIJlIl AI rI( a I OH 01 ll)l)(, 
2 S('I r lOll 2 i 7 (I). 11k uIller p ri III Jple~ i Ilcluck ('qUll Y d lid (rcl.J 1'0 pcHt'[H Y 
') HI(' word.'> 'iclldt'r' dnd 'hid' are Ullt-II u,~t~d Illierchangt:dbly rile S,\Jlllc applIes ru 111(; 
wo nh '( ('Ilcicr( 'r' ,Hid '1)1( Id e r' I'ur lite plirIJu.'>t"~ of I h I~ arll( Ie, use 'W I" pnlllJ nly IJe 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
certain contractors from participating in government contract awards. and 
so defeat compliance with the principles of fairness, competitiveness and 
cost-effectiveness in section 217(1) of the Constiturion. The debarment of 
contractors should furthermore comply wirh the Promocion of Admjniscra~ 
tive Justice Act (Paja),4 which provides for rhe protection of tenderers who 
participate in government procurement procedures. 
First. attention will be given to the legislation dealing with the rejection 
of tenders for rhe non-payment of taxes. In doing so, the focus will be on 
legislation rhar applies to national and provincial government and legis-
larion rhar applies to local government- Next, acrention will be given to the 
debarment of contractors. A disrinction will be drawn between debarment 
on the ground of unsatisfactory contractual performance and debarment 
on the ground of fraud or corruption. An overview will be given of the 
different legislation dealing with debarment, and a distinction will be 
drawn between legislation that applies to national and provincial govern-
ment and legislation that applies to local government. A critique will then 
be offered of such legislation. Finally, attention will be given to the de-
barment of contractors and the concepr of 'administrative action' as pro-
vided for in section 33 of the Constitution and Paja. 
2 REJECTION FOR THE NON·PAYMENT OF TAXES 
2.1 Legislation 
As noted above,S to ensure the a([ainment of the best value for money in 
the procurement process. it is important for competition to be sufficiently 
wide: rhe aim should be to attract the biggesr possible pool of competi-
tors. The rejection or disregard of tenders clearly has [he effect of reduc~ 
ing [he pool of competitors who participare in government procurement 
procedures. It is important. therefore, for strict rules to govern ehe rejec-
tion or disregard of tenders: an organ of state should have good reason For 
refusing ro consider a particular tender(s). At all three levels of govern-
ment, provision is made For the rejection or disregard of tenders. 
Ar national and provincial government level, the Regulations to the Pub~ 
lic Finance Management Act (PFMA)6 provide that an accounting officer? 
or accounting aurhorit/ must reject rhe render of a tenderer who fails to 
4 3 of 2000 
5 Par I. 
6 An I of 1999, as am(~nd(~d by Acr 29 of 1999. See the National Treasury: RcguJatio IS 
for Departments, Trading Enrities. Consriru[Jonal Instllu[ions and Public Enlllies Issu d 
in [cflTlS of [h(~ PubliC finance Management AC1, 1999, Government Gazette No. 273 iii, 
15 Marcil 2005 - hereafter the PfMA Regulations. 
7 The PFMA ddines an accoun{lng officer in s I as 'a person menlioned in seCLIon 16' 
SecLJon 16, in lurn, provides [hal all departmcnts and constitutional inSlitucions musc 
have accounling officers. In the case of departments. the head of th(~ department IS [hc 
accounting officer. dnd in Ihe case of consliUllionaJ insLiulIIons, the chief execucive offi-
cer is lhe accounting officer. In exceptional Clrcumstdnces, the National Treasury may 
instruct lhat a person o[hcr than the head of deparcmem or chiet executlve offICer be 
tile dccolHlling officer. 
8 The PPMA defines an accounting allthofilY Hl s I as 'a body or person mentioned in 
section 49' Section 49, in turn, provides chal every publIC emily must have an authori[y 










































'J III~ L.::XCLUSJON OF (ONlRACTORS FI{oM GOVEHNMENT CUNTHArT AWAHDS 
provide Wrtt(en proof from the South African Revenue Servlce (SARS) that 
It has no outstandlJ1g tax obligations or that it has made arrangements [0 
pay outslandlng taxes' Al local government level, on the other hand. the 
Supply Chain Management Regulations [0 the Local Government. MUnlCl-
pal i-inance Managemem Ac[ (MrMA)'l' provide that a supply chaln man-
agemem policy (SCrvtP) muse enable an accouming officer " to reject any 
tender from a tenderer whose municipal rates and taxes and municipal 
service charges arc in arrears for more lhan three months. J' 
2.2 Evaluation 
The different legislation referred [0 above clearly aims to ensure corn: 
pliance with the principles of compelltiveness and cost-dlccliveness.: 
From a cost-dlec([veness point of view. In particular, it can safely be 
assumed [hat a contracLor who is unable or unwilling to pay his or her 
taxes IS unlIkely [0 render satisfactory performance under a contract and 
lS likely to co~t an organ of state more In the long run Conlractors who do 
not pay their [axes also have an Unb:ilr competitive advantage over con-
tractors who do pay theIr taxes because [hey are able [0 submit lower 
tenders, Thus, [he relevant provisions in the prMA Regulations and the 
MFMA SCM RegulaLions serving as revenue colleCling measures also ensure 
compliance with [he pflncq)le~ oj competitiveness, fairness and COSL-
effectiveness, They further ensure that orgdns of sLate are not perceived 
tlldl IS elU tJlIl1[(\IlI!' tUI Ille pllrp()~l:~ ul III(' prrvlA II d pUlJlll t:IIII(Y Ilel~ a bllctrd or ottwr 
(mil rullllig hlJd)" ...,lJel! bUrJrd or c()rl!r(JlIII1~ body i..., Ille dt (OIJrlllflg dlJlllonry. dlld It el 
!,uull( l~nIWy' due~ IW[ lldve a c(lrilrolllrrg IIUd}I, the cillel exenlilve ot'lin r or ulht"r per-
<;Ori III (lldrgL I'> [III' dU(JlJlllilig rHIlIi()rlIY Tlil' Nrtll()Il,11 rrc;l<.;llry [lldY ;llsli lfl excefJllUllill 
(Irllllll~lrlll( l":'~ ill'>lnlLi [tldl dllOIIIl'r tUI1('tlolldry o~ rhc public enlity serve as [he de-
(ollll(ing dlHllorllY 
<) Ikguldtlon IbN) I (ti) flit" N,j(jOlidl Trt"dsilry, (iuverllllWrH Procureillclif l,cnnal CI)[\-
dllIOI1~ 01 {UII/r,l(1 (IlU<"..lII('r lilt' C( () dVrtllatJlc rtl IlIlj)"//WWW.lIl~dsllrygov/.al 
~11(JWptllld lillll, (1'>(' [he ..,Cdrt It cll~~lfll:, clICk on '( Ilief Dlrl!! (lHdLe, Nor!ll~ dl\d Sldn-
cLHtb' dl\d rIW!1 un 'ArHlt')iIJr(' 1\' (uJIl[lrIllt'd d(U'''.." ~~) JiHllldrY 200(,) rtlso [lrnvid[' 
Illd[ an orgdfl ul '>I,llt' [llllSl 1\()1 CI)Il[rdCi willi d tenderer whuse IclX Illdtll-rS are nol in 
order Till' ()rgd 11 (II <';1.11" 1\ 111~1 lie ~lIppljt;d willi rt II ()rJgillClI IdA clec\rance certi flc,lle 
I~slj(·d b}1 ~ARS Ic(cIUSt" 12)) :''IT dl...,o Nell JOIlAI 'I rCd<;IJrY SI1(lply Challl MClllagclIlL:11I 
Of Tit e, Prel( (It'e N\Jlv Nlll11il('r S{ M I ul ,~oo{) 'TdX ( It"MClll,'e (\;rrrl"icdlc'>' pdr I :) dli(i 
SBI) 2 'Ii-lx CI(:"jri-lllU' Ccrrrilcalf' Ikqlllrt'llIeJIIS' dvaJlault! al l\IIp./lwww rrect,>ury guv 
zd/,>IIUWptl1ld 11\111, cliCh <)1\ • I"rcasliry t'rdcllCC NOlc~' dlHI 111(;11 on 'SllpfJly (11i-llll Mall-
agt.'rnellt I'rdlli( (' NDle~' (COllI Irtllcd dl ( t;..,~, 25 JaCllJdry 2006) 
t 0 l\c( :,6 ot ;~ or)) ~u: tlw L.(JLill (juvdr 11111.:111 M IHile Ipell FllkltIU' Md IIClg(:lIlelll At-I. 2UU ') 
Iv1wlinp,ri Supply Ch;wl Mdlld,l!(;llleill Ht"gulallolls. (jovernmL'1l1 Gilzette No ,nl])(), 10 
MelY 2005 Ileredi[(:'r lilt: ~1F~1A SCM IkglJidlitlib 
I I Sect lUll III) or (lit: MFMA pruvldc-s tl1dt dll dlTuunl!llg OrrJCl:r fur (j 1l1l[lIiLlpa.li[y 'II\(;AnS 
HI(' rlllltllCipAI Uril( Itil rt"lt"rred III III Sl'( IIOil (,0' and lllar [he acrounllllg 1I1TICr:1 lor (l 
1lilHIlCipdl erllily 'Illt'dll~ tilt" ulllCldl ul' Ih( ('III II}' rt'f"l'rrt:d 10 in )l:Clioll In' dnd 'If]cludcs 
(j [wrsuil Clt'lltlg d) llrl~ dlHllltllirlg LJflll('( St"CliLJ1160 proVides lilat '[(jile llIuni('j~AI 
1I1ClIldgcr 01 cl lllllniu[li-lilly IS lilt: dn Olll11illg uffiler of Iht, lllullIClpalllY for llie [llJrp[)<.;['<.; 
oi" illl{; MHvlAj", alld ., 1)3 1.H(lVldt.:~ llial 'ILllie chid (:Xt~ClIIIVC otticer ot a IIIIJIIlCl(Jal en-
IHy clppolIl[ed 111 lernlS ot ~Cl Illln (J1J ut [tw Mlllli( Ipdl ~Y~[l"lll~ Au i'> llH: accounllng 
uffi( l:r 01 III(' CllIilY' 
12 Ikgllldliun 1H( I J(tlj(l) 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
by the general public as giving support to those who fail to pay their (axes 
which, in turn, enhances the integrity of the government procurement 
process. 14 On a critical note, however, it is submitted that provision should 
be made for the exclusion of contractors also on the ground of bank-
ruptcy, insolvency or winding-up.'~ These are 'obvious threat[sr to (he 
ability and continued ability of a contractor to render satisfactory per-
formance under a governmem contract. '() 
3 DEBARMENT'7 
3.1 General 
The debarment of a contractor is not the same as the disregard or rejec-
tion of a tender, though the consequences are similar. Debarment means 
that a contractor is excluded or barred from future participation in all 
government contract awards, whereas the disregard or rejection of a 
(ender, particularly for the non-payment of taxes,'S generally relates to a 
particular occasion. In the latter instance (the rejeC(ion of a tender). for 
example. a tender could on a specific occasion be rejected because the 
comracwr's taxes are not fully paid, whereas on a different occasion the 
comractor's tender may be considered because its taxes are fully paid. 
The rejection of a tender for (he non-payment of taxes can therefore be 
said to be a once-off decision which is dependent on the circumstances of 
the particular case. WI(h debarmem, however, a contracwr's name is 
blacklisted or removed from an organ of slate's lis( of approved contrac-
tors, and such removal is for an extended period of time. A comractor is, 
14 Arrow<;mllh S The law of TJublic und url/z/les procurement (2005) par [2 18 Sec also the 
European Community's new public procurement directives Anlcle 45(2)(t) of Direcrive 
2004JI8/EC on the coordinallon of procedures for [Ile award of public works contracts, 
public supply cont racts and public service comracts (tile Public Sector Directive) pro-
vides for the exclusion at contractors who have not paid their taxes - (2004) Official 
journal of the European UnIOn L 1341 [14 The same exclusionary rule applies under An 
54 of Directive 2004/1 7/EC coordinating the procurement procedures of enrjlies operat-
ing in Lhe water, energy. transport and posLal services sectors (the Utilities Directive) -
(2004) 0ffiL1a/Jollrna/ of rhe European Union L 134/1. 
[5 See genera Ily Arrowsrn ilb (Fn I 4 above) par 12.35. 
16 IbId. 
17 Debarment is also sometimes loosely referred to as 'blacklisung', 'exclusion' or 'sus-
pension'. Stricrly speaking, however, suspension (In parcicular) is different from debar-
ment because, unlike debarment, suspension is of a temporary nature. On debarment 
generally, see Arrowsmith (fn 14 above) pars 12.11-1242. For literature on debarme l[ 
and suspension in the Unired Srares, see Schooner SL 'The paper riger surs: Rethinki"g 
suspension and debarment' (2004) 5 Puu/It: Procurement Law Review 21 1-217; Brian 0 
'Contractor debarment and suspenSIOn: A broken sysrem' (2004) 5 Public Procurement 
Law Revzew 235-239; Madsen M 'The government's debarmenr process: Our-oF·step 
wirh current ethical standards' (2004) 5 Publzc Procuremenl Law ReVIew 252·254, Shaw 
SA 'Access to InformaLion. The key challenge to a credible suspension and debarment 
programme' (2004) 5 Publze Procurement Law ReView 210-214, Bednar RJ 'Emerging 
issues in sLlspension and debarment. Some observations from an experienced head' 
(2004) .5 Ptwllc Procurement Law Review 223-229 










































rilE EXCLUSION OF CONTH.ACTOH.S FRUM (iOVEHNMENT CONTH.ACT AWAH.DS 
in other words. excluded from partlciiJa(ing In all government procure-
ment procedure~. '. 
The debarment of contractors clearly reduces the pool of competitors 
who panicipate In government procurement iJrocedures and accordmgly 
has [he pO[ential (0 defeat the principles of compe[J[Jveness and cost-
effec(Jveness. 'l The debarment of a comrac(Or may also result in non-
complIance wah the principle of fairness· if an organ of state docs not 
follow proper procedures. for example, by allowing the contractor an 
opiJortunHY to be heard.-'- At all three levels of government. legisla[ion IS 
in place which mah.es provIsIon for the debarment of contractors. First, 
allenlion will be given to [he debarment of contractors on the ground or 
non-performance or unsatisfac(Ory performance under a previous govern-
ment contract. Thereafter, attention will be given [0 [he debarment of 
contraclors on the ground of fraud or corrupllon. In both instances (non-
performance and fraud or corruption), an overview wJlI first be given of 
the different leglslacion which makes iJrovision for debarrnent, and a 
cnllque will then be olTered or such legisla[Jon 
3.2 Debarment for unsatisfactory contractual performance 
3.2.1 Legislation 
A[ national and provmcial government level. (he PFMA RegulatJons pro-
vide that an accounling officer or authority 'may disregard [he bid of any 
bidder if that bidder, or any of its directors .. have failed to perform on 
any previous contract' " At local governmem level, on rhe other hand. [he 
MFMA SCM Regulations provide that an accounting officer must be able to 
reject (he tender of a tenderer '\vho during the last fIve years has failed ro 
perform sarisfactorily on a iJrevious contract with the municipall[y or 
municipal entity or any orher organ of stare after \vritren notice was given 
{O [hd[ Itendererl that performance wa~ unsatisfactory'. '·1 An accounting 
officer must also be able LO reject [he tender of (my tenderer if that ren-
derer. or any of its directors 'has willfully neglected, reneged on or railed 
Ii) III (lit' td~l' uJ" lilt: ddlcHlIH'lll o[ ((JIl(rd((OI::' 011 tilt gruulIlJ ut I\Ull-perfurrllitll(e or UII-
'>i-Illst ciCIO ry pcrtUrrlliHl("(: lind I:r d pn'Vi()llS gllvt:rrHllCf\l CUIiI ri-:lCl (~t:t: P,lr ') .2 bd(]w), il 
docs IIO[ apJJcM a~ Ih(ju~h ~1H'l\ ( 0111 rill lor,> arl'. ,>rrrcrly speah.lng. 'blCiCkllstc{j' Cr)[llraC-
lor'> wlltJ ilrlvc rt'IIIJ("rt'd lHI.'>dllsf.:KlUry c(jiliraclu,d perlurrlldIlc(" III llie Pd~( are. huw-
ever. 1 ..Jrt:VC'IlI('d by Ieglsld(lOIi trom ull1dilling Cllrllrdl·l." for ell! t~xlell(kd period uJ" IJlIlt> 
alll'r ~lli"ll u/1~<][lstCiCIOry pnfurilldril (~ cl~ wlIllw ::;t-;c;1l lJl'low (JJdr ) 2.1) rtWlr exclusion 
I rolll gow:rrllll('lli (OIllrcl[ I dWdrds (dll rlt,relure bl" regarded as t~lling wllhin the .'~en· 
(~ral 11\t'dllill,~ ut 'dclJdflm"nr' 
d() ':>I'Ci lorl 21 7( II ot (11(: ( (JlIsllIllll()11 
,2 I Ihul 
22 ~C(' par 4 IJt"low. where Il I~ drgll(~t1I!tdt till' de( l"jOII 10 delJclr d lOlllrJuor [rum Illiurc 
~()VernIJlCIH (OIHra( I dwanb dlll()lllll~ 10 'cl(jl1llllblralive ill·IIOIl· wl(IIIII lli{: I1leanIllg ot 
~ )) of (il(' COII~llIlIlIIII! dlld Pilji-l, lililS clilHilng [he attccwci (OrHraCior 10, Infer u/w. elIl 
OppUrll1l1l1y 10 be Ileard 
,n Ikgl11dllUII I hNI 2(a)(llI) 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
to comply with any government, municipal or other public sector contract 
during the past five years'. 25 
3.2.2 Evaluation 
The legislation discussed above clearly aims to ensure compliance with 
the principles of competitiveness and cost,effectiveness,26 From a cost' 
effectiveness point of view, in particular, a failure on the part of a contrac, 
tor to render satisfactory performance under a previous government 
contract leads to the logical assumption that the contractor is unlikely to 
render satisfactory contractual performance in future. The debarment of 
contractors on the ground of unsatisfactory performance thus ensures that 
organs of state conduct business with only responsible and reliable con-
tractors which, in turn, ensures the efficient use of taxpayers' money.27 
To ensure compliance with the principle of fairness (and competitive-
ness), however, it is important to guard against the unfair treatment of 
contractors. It appears that the rules that apply to national and provincial 
government are stricter than the rules that apply to local government. At 
national and provincial government level, no time period is attached to 
the failure on the part of a contractor to render satisfactory performance 
under a previous contract to justify the rejection of its tender - the PFMA 
Regulations simply refer to the failure to perform on 'any previous con-
tran'.28 A contractor's tender could therefore, on a literal interpretation, 
be rejected, regardless of when or how long ago it failed to perform under 
a previous contract. A contractor's tender could, for example, be rejected 
because twenty years ago it failed to render satisfactory performal"'lce 
under a contract. This would clearly be unduly harsh. It is, furthermore. 
not necessary for a contractor to have been at fault in the non-perform-
ance of a previously awarded contract to justify the rejection of its tender 
- the PFMA R.esulations simply refer to 'the [failure] [Q perform' on a pre-
vious contracL L A contractor's tender could thus (again), if read literally. 
be rejected even if its failure to perform under a previous contract was not 
due co its own fault but as a resull of, for example, Jorce majeure. 30 
3.2.3 Submission 
it is submitted that the rules [hat apply to national and provincial govern-
ment for debarment on the ground of unsatisfactory contractual performance 
25 Regula[ ion 38( I )(g)(iil). 
26 Secrion 2 I 7( I) of the COnS[![U[lOn 
27 See also the United States Federal Acquisition RegUlations (FAR), in particular FAH 
9.1Q6-2(b)( 1 )(i). which provldes for debarment on the ground of 'Willful railure to per-
rorm' under one or more contracts. '[al history of failure to perform' or 'unsatisfactory 
performance of, one or more contracts' 
28 Regula(ion 16AQ 2(a)(iii) (emphaSIS added) 
29 Regulation 16A9.2(a)(iii) (emphasis added). 
30 The GCC (clause 1.12) defines force majeure as 'an event beyond [he control of the 
lcontracLOrj and not involVing the [cuntractor's] faulL ur negligence and not foreseeable. 
Such events may include. but are not restrlcted to. acts of the [organ of state] in Its sov-











































TilE EXCLUSION OF CONTRACTORS FROM GOVER.NMENT CONTRACT AWARDS 
may, on d lileral tn(erpre(a(ion. unduly exclude cenatn contracLOrs from 
pafllcipaling in governmem procurement procedures and so ddeat lhe 
principles of fairness, compelitiveness and cosl-effecUveness,l' f\ejecting a 
contraclor's tender because of a mere 'lfal/ure] to perForm'1~ on 'any 
prevIOus contrac['~' may lead LO unfair lfeatmem and unduly limi( com-
peli(ion, A contractor's lender should be rejened only iF [he Failure to 
perform was 'willful', The COnlraClOr must, as is [he case a[ local govern-
ment level, have 'willfully neglec[ed, reneged on or failed to comply With' 
a governmem contracl. c4 It is furthermore imponam for a (ime perIod lO 
be a((ached LO the non-performance or unsalisfactory performance by a 
contracLOr on a previous contracl. IJere, (00, the lime period may be sim-
ilar lO [he perIod (ha( applies lO local government (i,e, the preceding five 
yea rs) ',' 
It is thus proposed (hat it is important for (he wording of the prMA 
Regula(ions, in panicular Regulalion I 6A9,2(a)(lii), to be interpreted in ac-
cordance Wilh the Cons(j(ution, panicularly for present purposes the prin-
ciples of fairness, cOmpe[iliveness and cost-effeC[iveness in seclion 217( I) 
of the ConstitUlion,'~ Section 6(2)(h) of raja similarly reqUires reasonable 
adminlslrative action on (he part of state organs, AJternalively, Regu-
la(ion 16A9,2(a)(jii) should be amended in such a way tha[ il is more in 
rune with the wording of Regula[ion 38( I )(g)(iii) of [he MFMA SCM Regula-
tions, Doing so would lO a large extem ensure that the rejection of a 
contractor's tender For non-perFormance or unsatisfactory performance 
under a previous contracl complies with the principles of fairness, com-
pClillveness and cost-effectiveness, 1/ 
3,3 Debarment on the ground of fraud or corruption 
3.3.1 General 
The word 'corruption' has been afforded a number of dicrionary mcan-
ings,'\H More relevant For present purposes. corruption has been dcscflbed 
as -
11 Sl'('(ion 217(1) (JI'III(' C()n~fIIlIlIlHI 
12 Itq.;ulal]Oll 16NI 2(a)(ili) ({'mphasls dddl'd) 
1) Rq:;uldliorl I (,A9 2«1)(lIi) (t~lllplio~is (Jelded) 
34 Regularion 18( 1 )(g)(lIi) of [h(~ M!-=MA SCM HI'guldIIiHI:-' 
15 Itc~ubliun 1H( I J 19)(iilj ot rhe MfMA SCM Rq:(IILll ione., 
16 Sc(':-' 19(2) of lile COlISUlLllioll which providl'S rhal '[wIllen 1l11t'rprtUllg <lny it'glslalJoJl 
, (-'very coun. trIiJllrli-ll or forurll 1I11.l..,1 prortlOle [hl' ~Jmll, purporr dnd objects of rill' 
Rill of HI!4Ii1s', III Ihis r('g,nt!. S('t' S 1) ()f flw { IH1Slilulion wllich gf'lwrdlly deals Wilh 'JU"I 
il d III irllsl rd IIVl! aC[Jon·. I e dUlllllUS[rdliVe d( [JOn I hill IS. Inter ll/W. lawful. redsonable 
and procedurally Idir As expounded UpOIl bdow (par 4), [he courts Ilave held [hal [he 
(ondw l o! the govururwnl prot Un'IiIl!rll pron!s:-" 11\1' CVdlU'llioll of Il~llCkrs and 11ll: 
ilWil rd Ilf d I( 'lid er loa. sucu-:ssl ul It:nderer a re all forms of 'adlllllll~lrallve aello n' wi II1In 
rllt, lllLdlllllg o! ~ '31 o! !lie Corl~llllllj(Hl klrld l\iJii) TillIS. 1l~lld(:rer~ are c[llitled 10 pro-
(,[Hem('111 prot t'dur('s dnd (krislolls [hill an', in/a alw, lawful. rCdsollcttJll' ,llId pru-
c('tilHiilly rim See IUrlher par 4 below on rht-! c1etJdrl11enr of cornraCl<lrs and I Itt-! (OIlC(~pl 
uf 'ad'll'lllsiralivc acriotl' 
'37 SI'l'lIOlI 217(1) of Ihe ('()!I~lltllfl()1i 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY a. DeV~LOPMENT -
the abuse of entrusted power for personal gain or for the benefit of a group to 
which one owes allegiance. /[ involves behaviour on the part of officials in the 
public seccor, whether politicians or civil servants. in which [hey improperly 
and unlawfully enrich themselves or those close [0 [hem by [he misuse of (he 
public power entrusted to them. [The following elements must furthermore be 
present for corruption to take place, Le.] a public official, discretionary power, a 
misuse of that public power by the public official and a benefit (whether in 
money or in kind) resulting [0 that official.
1Q 
In the government procurement context, corruption can take a number of 
forms. Corruption on the pan of tenderers may take the form of, inter 
alia, collusion in the submission of tenders (also referred to as collusive 
tendering arrangements); influencing the work of evaluators; inciting 
breaks of confidentiality: the offering of bribes; over- and under-invoicing: 
influencing the choice of procurement method or technical standards; 
'fronting', i.e. where black people are signed up as fictitiouS shareholders 
in essentially 'white' companies;40 and/or inaccurate disclosures in the 
submission of tenders. 41 Corruption on the part of public officials, on the 
other hand. may take the form of, inter alia, the preparation of slanted 
tender specifications; the approval of inappropriate tenders; tampering 
with tenders; breaching confidentiality; the taking of bribes; the use of 
position (Q obtain a private benefit; and/or the lax administration of a 
contract after its conclusion.42 
Whichever form corruption takes, corrupt practices are generally re-
garded as immoral and improper in terms of good procurement practice. 
It is extremely damaging to the procurement process because it reduces the 
confidence that honest contractors and the public at large have in the 
government. Corruption leads to the slackening of competition for govern-
ment contracts and impacts negatively on the government's ability to 
obtain the best possible value for money. Corruption also impacts nega-
tjvely on the attainmem of other objectives in the procurement process. for 
example, policy promotion and the fair treatment of contractors.4~ It is, 
therefore, not strange for legislation to make provision for the debarment of 
contractors from government contract awards on the ground of corrup[ion. 
3.3.2 OVerview oj legislation 
The primary legislation that makes provIsion for [he debarment of 
contractors on the ground of fraud or corruption is the Prevention and 
39 S[apenhurs[ F and Langseth P 'The role of the public adminisrra(ion in fighting corrup-
tion' (1997) 10(5) International JOZlrnal of Public Sector Management 3' 1-330, 313 (foot-
notes omitted). See also Nye JS 'Corruption and political development: A COSt benefit 
analysis' (1967) 61 American PolitIcal Science Review 41 7, 419. 
40 Also referred (0 as 'window dressing' or 'tokenism'. 
41 See generally [he Ministry of Finance and Public Works, Green Paper on Public Sec(Or 
Procurement Heform in South Africa. Government Gazelte No. 17928. 14 April 1997 -
clause 4 1 I. 
42 Ibid 
43 On the use of government procurement as a policy (001 in South Africa, see generally 
Bolto n P 'The use of gover nmem procurement as an instrument of policy' (2004) 12 I (3) 
SAL] 619; Bo!(On P The legal regulatIOn oj government procZlrement in SOZlth Africa (un-
published LLD thesis. UniverSity of the Western Cape. 2005) ch 6. See also ch 5 on [he 










































THE EXCLUSION OF CONTRACTORS FROM GOVERNMENT CONTRACT AWARDS 
Cornba[[ng of Corrupt Acrivicics Ac[ (Corruption Act),~~ which applies [0 all 
three levels of government. The An makes provisIon for offences In 
respect of corrupt anivicles relating to COnLraCLS,~~ a.nd offences in respect 
of corrupc acrivltles rela[Jng [0 the procuring and wi(hdrawal of tenders.IL 
Section 28( I )(a), in particular, provides [hal a coun, when conVICting a 
person of an offence in respect of corrupt aC[lvities rela[ing [0 contracts or 
corrupt activities relaring [0 the procuring and withdrawal of tenders 
'may', in addition (0 imposing any sentence contempla[ed in section 26, 
order that the parciculars of the person, the conviction and sentence, and 
a.ny other order of the coun consequent thereon, be endorsed on the 
Register for Tender Defaulters. If the person convicted is an enterprise, 
the court may also order that -
(I) [he particulars of [hal enterprise, 
(11) the panlculars ot" any fJarmer, manager, director or ocher person, who 
wholly or partly exercises or may exercise conlrol over lhal enterprise and 
who was involved In rhe offence concerned or who knows or oughl rea-
sonably to have I~nown or suspected that the enterprise commiued the of-
fence concerned, 
(Ill) the conViction, sentence and any other order ot [he coun consequent 
thereupon, 
be endorsed on the Regls(er I, 
The court may, furthermore, order the endorsement on the Register of -
(I) dny other emerprise owned or controlled by [he person so convlcred, 
or 
(ii) the particulars of any panner, manager, direC[or or other person, who wholly 
or partly exerCises or may exercise control over such otlier enterprise, and 
which -
(aa) enterprise, partner. manager, direCtor or other person was involved in 
the offence concerned: or 
(bb) partner, manager, dlreC[or or oUier person knew or oughr reasonably 
La have known or suspected rhar such other enterprise was Involved 
in the ottence concerned. ,. 
An endorsemenr on the Register for Tender Defaulters also applies, unless 
the court directs otherwise, [0 every enterprise which will be established 
in the future and which will be wholly or parely controlled or owned by 
the convlered or endorsed person or enterprise,l~ The Registrar must also 
endorse the Register acc:ordingly.·'·(' Chapter 6 of (he Corruprion Act makes 
provision for the establishment of the Register for Tender Defaulters, [he 
designation of a Registrar, [he powers, duties and functions of [he RegiS-
trar, access to the Regis[er by the public, and regulations pertaining to the 
,1-'1. Acl 1201 200-1 
4~ SC( 11011 12 
46 SC( [Idll I') 
~7 ~eClluII 2H( I )lhl 
48 ~ecrlun ::!H( 1 )(c) (t:lTlpl IclSI~ addt"d) 











































I· LAW, DEMOCMCY& DEVELOPMENT-
Register. The National Treasury may decide on the period of endorsement 
of offenders in the Register, but such period may nO[ be less than five years 
or more than [en years. 51 During the period of endorsement, any offer ten~ 
dered by the relevant party must be ignored or disqualified by the National 
Treasury. purchasing authority or government department concerned.
52 
The Regulations Regarding the Regiseer for Tender DeFaulters (as re~ 
quired by chapter 6 of the Corruption Act) have been promulgated.53 
Provision is made for the inclusion of the particulars in the Register nO( 
only of the actual person(s) or enterprise(s) convicted for fraud or corrup~ 
(ion, but also the 'names of persons identified by the court of law to have 
been implicated by the conviction' as well as 'enterprises linked to the 
convicted enterprise' .~4 Notice of entry into the Register must be given to 
affected parries after such entry has been made (i.e. 'within 14 days after 
such entry,).55 The particulars of persons or enterprises entered into the 
Register 'must' furthermore be retained in the Register for 20 years,56 this 
being the period of endorsement referred to in section 28( I )(a) of the Cor~ 
rup(ion Act, and the Register must be available for public access.
57 
5 I Seccion 28(3)(a)(ii). 
52 Secclon 28 (3)(a)(iii). The Minis[er of Finance has also, in cerms of s 13 of the Stace 
Tender Board Ac[ 86 of 1968, amended Regulation 2 of che Scale Tender Board Regu-
lations (published in Government Gazelle No. I 1328, I July 1988 as set out In the Sched-
ule) by making provision for penalties for contracts concluded as a result of corruption. 
Spedfic provisiDn is made for the debarment of contractors. Regulation ;(5)(a)(iv) pro-
vides, inter alia, that 'the Board may, in addition to any ocher legal remedies it may 
have, resolvc that no offcr from [he person concerned should be considered during such 
period as the Buard may stipulate'. Regulation 3(5)(b), however, provides that '[tlhe 
Board may at any time vary or rescind any restriction'. The Preferential procurement 
Regulations, Government Notice R725, Government Gazetre No. 22549, 10 Augusc 2001 
(applicable to all three levels of government) also make proVision for penalcies for the 
fraudulen[ attainment of preferences and/or (he non-attainment of specified goals in the 
performance of a contract. Regulallon 15(2)(d) provides that an organ of Slate may 're-
strict the contraccor, its shareholders and direClors from obtaining business from any 
organ of state for a period not exceedmg 10 years'. The Regula[ions are currently (25 
January 2006) in [he process of being redrafted - see the Preferential Procurement Pol-
icy Framework Ac[, 2000 (Acc No 5 of 2000): Draft Preferential Procurement Regu-
la[ions. Government Gazette No. 26863, 4 October 2004. 
53 Regulations Regarding the Register for Tender Defaulters. Government Gazette No. 
27365, I I March 2U05. 
54 Regulations [( 1 )(9) and J (I )(h). See also Unt[ed States FAR 9.406-5, which provides for 
a similar scope for debarment. 
55 Regulation 2. 
56 Regulation J. 
57 Regulation 5. The International Labour Organisation (lLO) Labour Clauses (Public Con-
tracts) Convention, 1949 (No. 94) also makes provision for the debarment of contrac-
tors. Article 5 1 prOVides that '[a]dequate sanctions shall be applied, by the Withholding 
of contracts or otherwise, for failure to observe and apply the provisions of labour 
clauses in puhllc contraccs'. See also Turpin C (Bn"tish government and the conslltution: 
34 
Text, cases and materials (1990) 60. 414). wl\ere the author points aU[ that during 1975 
and 1978 che Bmish Governmenc used HS comracting power in support of counter-
infla[lOn policy on wage.'>. All comrac[Ors who paid wages higher than those approved 
by [he (iovernment were blacklis[ed and denied [he award of governmem contracts. 
Blacklisted firms could also not challenge [he Government's actions in (he courts because 
[heir legal rights had noc been infringed - comractors were nor regarded as baving a 









































THE EXCLUSION OF CONTRACTORS FROM GOVERNMENT CONTRACT AWARDS 
The PFMA f\egula(ions (applicable [0 national and provincial govern-
ment) rei(erate the provIsions or the Corruption Act pertaining [0 debar-
menr and provide that a tender may not be awarded to a contractor that 
is 'listed' (i.e. who~e name i~. (1.':> ~laled In lhe Corruprion Act, 'endorsed') 
on [he Na[ional Treasury's database as a company or person prohibited 
rrom doing business with [he public sec[Or.'" An accoun[ing officer or 
accounting authority muse also 'rejeC( a proposal for the award of a con-
tract If the recommended bidder has commined a corrupt or fraudulenr 
ac[ In COrrl~)e[Jng for lhe lJartlcular contract'.;\~ An accounting off jeer or 
aurhorily 'may' furthermore '(a) disregard the bid of any bidder if that 
bidder, or any of irs dlrecrors (i) have abused the institution's supply cham 
management system; lorl (ii) have committed fraud or any other im-
proper conduct in relalion [0 such syslem; [and] (b) muse inform the 
relevanL lreasury of any action taken In terms of paragraph (af .',c 
The MFMA SCM Regulations (applicable to local government) funher 
provide that an SCMP 'must disallow Lhe listing of any prospective pro-
Vider whose name appears on the National Treasury's database (i,e. In the 
Register for Tender Defaulters) as a person prohibited from doing busi-
ness with the public sec[Or'.)1 An SCMP must also enable an accounting 
officer [0 reject a recommendallon for the award of a conrract to a [en-
derer who 'has commirted a corrupt or fraudulent act in competing for the 
particular contract' ."- An accoummg officer must furthermore be able to 
reject the tender of any renderer if [hat [enderer, or any of its directors -
(I) has abused [he supply chain management sysrem of [he municipalJ[y or 
municipal en[J[y or has commmed any Improper conducr In relarion ro 
such system, 
(Ilj has been convicted for fraud or corrupuon during the pas[ five years: or 
~H I{cgulallon I hA<) 1 I( J 
59 H.eglliCl(IOIl 16NJ 1 (e) (1:IllphdSI::' added). 
60 !kgulililorl I ()A') 2 H.l'guldlJon 3(5)(<1) oj llit: ~Iale render Buard Acr H6 of 196R. 
ArnendrlH'll1 to fkgulillio[\s of IIIE State lender Bocmj A( [ HI [nrns of s I ) ai<>o prOVides 
lirA! If Ihe 'I clldel I\ocwj 1<" of Itll' 0P'lIlO[\ [hAl d pn::'OII '(iv) wliu lidS cUliciuded all 
agreement referred l() In st'c(Jun 4( J lid) 01 lite Act. has prontised, offered or gl\.:en d 
1m!..)!', or 'Id~ d( I cd in respe( r tilC'rcof ill il frawiu I( 'nl Illa II lie r or in belli fall h Of In rilly 
olht~r Improper IlIdllrwr. llll: B()clrd Illtly. HI addllion to any oiller leg,t! rt'rlledlt!s il may 
liaVl-, resolvt' 111dt 110 off('r from [hI: p(~rsull concerned should bt' consld("red dUrlng such 
p(:rrud d'> IiI(' j-l,odrd lliClY slipulale' Sec dl'>o par -l7 of Ilk Sidle Tender Board CelH~rdl 
( ondl[I()!I;, and Procedures (~T 16) 
61 Regllialloll 11\( 1 )(e) A (OnlrilUor's lldlllC could drgllililly Ill: removed frolll d lisl of 
dC< rt'dlled proS!k:Clivt, providers Abo dl)(: [0 d falitHe [0 respond 10 l(~nder IllvilalilJII~ or 
d fdllur(: 10 IlldlllldJrl Ill(' prcs( rJllCd <;IClnd.-In/<" ur cOlldlLJons I,wi down for Illciusion 011 
IIle pArll( lIiar IISI Sec Turpin C (;uvernnu-'nl procuremenl and Ulnlrm:IS (19Hl)) 240 The 
rt'lTluvdl of a «(Hllrd( 101 Ilorn d ihl would, Iluwcver. be approprlalt' only If lilere are 
n IdrlY sllpplw r~ rhus. I tw /lIore ~IIPpli(" r~ (ht~rt: d rl' of rill' goods or Sf..: rvice.'> needed by 
dn orgdll 01 Slalt'. Ihe t:d<,lt;r II would 1)<" 10 oblclin rile goods or services ell reasonable 
COSI d~C!wltere Ille re!lloval 01 a :'f-lC{ il'l( uJIllrdClor would lilerd'ore give rJse 10 Few 
diffilullle:. (if' allyl. On Ille OIlIer band, rllZ! fewer :.uppliers (ltere; are of [he goods or ser-
Vlce'> w:ed('d by dll urgilll of srale, rlw more difficult 11 would IJe to obtain rile goods or 
.'>ervlct'<; ill reasolldule COS I t'lsC'wllt'l e llle re III OVe! I ot a speclilc contractor is therefore 
Ilkely (0 gJl,le riSe; (0 more dlf'ficU1l1{~~ 










































, -LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
? - , '" - .1 
(iv) has been listed in [he Register for Tender Defaulters in terms of section 29 
of the lCorrupuon ActJ.
63 
The White Paper on Municipal Service PartnershipsIA similarly proposed 
(in 2000) that 'ltJhe proposal of any bidder that has engaged in a corrupt 
practice must automatically be rejected'. Also, 'la]ny contract awarded as 
a result of corrupt procurement processes must be declared void ab initio, 
In addition, a bidder that has engaged in a corrupt practice in a govern~ 
ment procurement process should be barred (temporarily or permanently) 
from bidding in other government procurement processes' ,I>S 
3.3.3 Evaluation 
Fraud and corruption defeats compliance with all the principles in sec-
tion 21 7( 1) of the Constitution. 66 In principle, therefore, the rules regard-
ing [he debarment of COnlraClOrS on the basis of fraud or corruption are 
nor improper if effect is lO be given lO section 217(1). The exclusion of 
contraclOrs on the ground of fraud or corruption also enhances the integ~ 
rity of the government procurement process - organs of state are prohib~ 
ited from associating themselves with convicted contraclOrs. ContraclOrs 
involved in illegal activities are thus nor supported. and there is support 
for government poliCies embodied in criminal legislation.6? The existence 
of a Register for Tender Defaulters further alleviates the need for organs of 
state lO spend time and effort reviewing the capability of debarred con~ 
traclOrs - they can simply exclude debarred contraclOrs from considera~ 
tion which, in turn, leads to cos[-savings,69 Criticism can, however, be 
leveled against the legislation dealing with debarment on the ground of 
fraud or corruption, on a number of issues. 
63 Regulallon 38( I Hg) Article 15 of the Unllerl Na[lons Commission on In[ernational Trade 
Law (UNC1TRAL) Model Law on Procurement of Goods. Construction and Services. 1994 
also provides [hal '[a] procuring enlity shall reject a tender, proposal, offer or quotation 
if the supplier or corHractor thal submilted it offers. gives or agrees (0 give. direcLly or 
indirectly, to any current or former officer or employee of the procuring entity a gratu-
i[y in any form. an offer of employment or any other (hing of service or value. as an in~ 
ducement with respect [0 an act or decision of. or procedure followed by. (he procuring 
enlilY in connection with [he procurement proceedings'. 
64 Department of Provincial and Local Government. While Paper on MuniCipal Service 
Parrnerships. General No[ice 1689 of 2000, Government Gazette Vol 4 [8. no 21 126. 26 
April 2000 (clause 4.9). 
65 Ibid. Clause 17 of the City or Cape Town. Contracts ror Services: Special Conditions of 
Tender available a[ hnp:l/www.capetown.gov.zaltenders/pdf/Special.pdf (confirmed 
access. 25 January 2006) also provides [he following: 'If Tenderers ... or any person 
employed by ttlem, are found [0 tlave either direc[ly or indirectly offered. promised or 
given to any Councillor or person in [he employ ot the Council. any commission, gratu-
ity, glf[ or o[her considera[lOn. [he Council shall have [he rlgh[ summarily and without 
recourse [0 law and without prejudice to any other legal remedy which it may have in 
regard to any loss and/or additional COSI or expenses, to disqualify [he Tender ... With-
out paying any compensa(ion to Ihe aforesaid Tenderer' (emphasis added). 
66 See par 3.3.1 supra 
67 See also Piselli E 'The scope for excluding providers who have committed criminal 
offences under the EU procurement directives' (2000) 6 Public Procurement Law Review 
267 268. 
68 On suspension and debarment as efficiency measures, see Kramer RE 'Awarding 
Contracts to suspended and debarred firms: Are stricter rules necessary?' (2005) 34(5) 










































THE EXCLlJSION O}: CONTRACTORS FROM GOVERNMENT CONTRACT AWARDS 
(a) The endorsement period of 20 years 
The Regulations Regarding the Register for Tender Defaulters may have 
undue consequences The particulars of persons or enterprises entered 
into the Register must, in terms of the Regulations, remain in the RegIster 
for 20 years"'w This IS in conflict with section 2R(1Ha)(ii) of the Corruption 
Act. which provides that once the Register has been endorsed in accord-
ance with a coun order, 
[he National Trcasury must determine the period (WhlCh may not be less than 
flve years or more than 10 years) for which [he rarucl;Jlars of the convicted per-
son or [he enterpl'1se must rcmaln in the Registci ,0 
Regulation 3 is clearly invalid because it is in direct conflict with sec-
tion 2R(1)(a)(iI) of the Corruption Act It is submitted that the Regulation 
should be rephrased to state that the particulars of persons or enterprises 
must remain in the Register for a period of five years. This can be argued 
Lo be a reasonable period of tllne, and is also in line with the argument 
that the underlymg policy of the debarment of contracLors should nOL be 
the punishment of contrac[Qrs (debarment is, in any event, in addition to 
any sentence a court may impose in terms of section 26 of the Corruption 
Ace i' ) but rather the protection of Lhe state against unscrupulous and 
unethical contractors It is submitted that an endorsement period of 20 
years is unreasonably long - it has as its primary aim the punishment of 
contrac\.ors and nOL the proLection of Lhe sLate againsL the risk of uneLhlcal 
contraclors. Government procurement is business, and the debarment of 
a contractor should be viewed as a business decision. A debarment period 
of 20 years nO[ only unduly punishes convicted contracLors but also 
unduly limits competition and inhibits organs of state from obtaining 
goods and services at [he best possible price.': 
It is, furthermore, important for provision to be made for contractors [0 
apply to the National Treasury for the reduction of [he period or extent of 
debarment. Such application should, however, be accompanied by ~upport­
ing documentation, for example, '( I) lnjewly discovered material evidence; 
(2) [rleversal of the conviction or civil judgment upon which the debarment 
was based; (3) [bjona fide change in ownership or management; (4) 
()i.) f\egLJld I i(HI 3 
70 J.:: rnplla~IS add{ 'd. ~ee d Iso Itegllia lion 1 ( I )(k) ot I J Ie (\egulalluns re~ardl ng [he Heglslc:r 
for Tender Derdulters Wlllcli prOVides lilal rile ·periud 01 cndor')C;rllCI11 conremplilled In 
5ectlOn 28(3)(0)(11) 0/ Ow fCorrllprlOn/ Au' must be erHcr{'d ill lite Rcgislt~r ror Tcnder (k-
taulrcrs (t'l1lphaSI~ added) 
71 See 5 28( I )(a) 01 rile CorrLllJrlUn Act and par 3 ) 2 ~l1prtl 
72 See lInited ~t.alC:s FAR 9 406-4(d)( j l. whit h prOVI(jc,) lilar lilt.: lJeriad at debarlllelll 
should g{~llt"rally lIot excr:'{~d three yedr~ For V!Oldlions of provisions corHamed In tile 
Drug-rree Workpiact' Ac( 01 (l)8H. llie period of deuctrlllelH llIay nOl exceed tive years 
(f'AR 9 406-4(a)( I )(I)J Under Eurupedll (OllllllWlilY law, 110 tillle period is 'j[Jpulared tur 
the neuarment of CUlI([(lC(ors 1·lle pt'rlod of deuarnlenr Ihus lalls wllilill the discretion 
of rTH~mbt'r Slales ~e(·. in pdrti( llJar. Art 45 of tile PublIC Se([ur U\recllve See also An 
~4 of Iltl' LJI!lltj('~ ])m'UIV(' Set' fLlrllwr tIl(> IlllputJlbhed drafl paper of WlIlJams S 'The 
mallddlory CXclLlSlOrl~ ror corruplloll ll\ the Ilt·W EC prOClireIl1c:rH dm.:c[lves· 16 on file 










































, LAW. Q6MOCRACY & 06VaOPMENT _ 
[eJlimination of other causes for which the debarment was imposed; or (5) 
{o]ther reasons the [National Treasury] deems approrlate,.73 
Thus, even though debarment inevitably has a punirive function (it has 
adverse financial implications for a contractor and often detrimentally 
affects a contractor's reputation, sometimes to the extent that it is unable 
[Q obtain contracts from mher sectors). the primary function of debar~ 
ment should be to protect organs of state against unnecessary risk; the 
ultimate aim should be to protect the public purse.74 A debarred contractor 
should furthermore. in principle. be allowed to continue performance 
under an existing contract. A contract with a debarred comractor should. 
as is provided for in the Corruption Act, be terminated only after the 
National Treasury has taken account of a number of factors, such factors 
generally being aimed at ensuring that termination does not result in 
undue loss being suffered by the government party.7~ 
(b) The court"s discretion to order endorsement 
The Corruption Act. by the use of the word 'may' ,70 affords the couns 
discretion to order the blacklisting of convicted persons or enterprises. 77 In 
light of the serious nature and consequences of debarmenr.7B this is to be 
commended.
7Q 
The Act (and the Regulations Regarding (he Register for 
Tender Defaulters) does not, however. offer gUidance on the factors that a 
court should rake accoum of when exercising the discretion to debar. It is 
submi[(ed that [he public interest should guide the courtS in exercising 
their discretion. The primary aim of the decision to debar should not, as 
noted above, be [he punishmem of comractors. but rather the proteCtion 
of the state against riSK. A court should determine in each case whether 
the fraudulent or corrupt acts of a contractor warrant limiting competition 
to fewer potential contractors with whom the s[a[e may comracr. As noted 
by Kramer,Bo the question to be asked is: 'Can we trUSt thiS contractor to 
provide what the government needs?' and not 'Is this conrraC[Qr a bad 
contractor?' Thus. 
[t]he derermmation whether to suspend or debar a contractOr (0 protect the 
public interest is ... a bUSiness decision that requires a weIghing of the risks 
and benefits to the Government of contracting with an ethIcally questionable 
firm.. The fact that a [coun] has determined [hat, in general, the risks of do-
ing business wirh a particular firm outweigh the benefits does not mean that 
specific circumstances cannot tip the balance. sl 
73 United Scates FAR 9.406·4(c). See also par 3.3.3(c) below on waivers during [he period 
of debarment. 
74 See furtbcr Kramer (fn 68 above) 539, 541 -545; Zucker JS 'Tbe Boeing suspension: Has 
increased consolida[ion (ied (he Uni{ed Stales Department of Defense's bands' (2004) 5 
Public ProCllremenl Law Review 260 276, 260. See also United States ~AR 9.402(b), 
which highlights [he non-puni(ive nature of debarmenr 
75 Section 28( I )(3)(j)(aa) of [he Corruption Acc. See also Umted States FAR 9.405-1. 
76 See ss 28( 1 )(a)-28( O(c) 
77 See also United Scates FAR 9.402(a) which provides (ha[ debarment is a discretionary 
action. 
78 See par 3.3.1 supra 
79 See United Slates FAR 9.402(b). 
80 Fn 68 above, 544. 










































THE EXCLUSION Or CONTRACTORS FROM liOVEHNMENT CONTRACT AWARDS 
Possible mitigating factors that a coun may take account of before order-
ing (he endorsement of the particulars of an offender on [he Register for 
Tender Defaulters include the following: 
(I) Whecher the comractor had effective standards of conduc[ and internal 
control systems in place at the time of the activity which constitutes cause 
for debarment or had adopted such procedures pnor to any Government 
investigation of the acciv ity Cited as a cause for debarment. 
(2,1 Whether the contractor brough[ the activity cited as a cause for debarment 
co the a[[ention of [he appropriate Government agency in a timely manner 
n) Whether the contractor has fully investigated the Circumstances sur-
rounding the cause for debarment and, If so. made the result of the inves-
tigation available to the Icour[]. 
(4) Whether the contractor cooperated fully with Governmem agenCies during 
the invesugation and any court or administrative aCtlon. 
(5) Whether the contractor has paId or has agreed to pay all crimInal, civil, 
and administrative liabllily for the improper aCl1Vily, including any investi-
gative or adminlstrallve costs Incurred by the Government, and has made 
or agreed to make Full restitution 
(6) Whe[her the comraccor has taken dppropriate diSCiplinary action against 
the indiViduals responSible for the activIty whICh constitutes cause for de-
barment 
(7) Whether the contractor has Implemented or agreed to Implement reme-
dial measures, Including any identified by the Government. 
(8) Whe[her the contractor has instituted or dgreed to ins[itute new or reVised 
review and control procedures and ethiCS [raining programmes. 
(9) Whether the contractor has had adequate time to eliminate the cir-
cumstances wltt11n tt1e comractor's organization that led to the cause for 
debarment 
(10) Whether [he contractor's management recognizes and understands the 
seriousness of the misconduct giVing rise to the causi, for debarment and 
has Implemented programmes to prevent recurrence 
A consideration of (he above factors will ensure that an order for the en-
dorsement of the particulars of a convicted offender on [he Kegister for 
Tender Defaulters IS in the public interest and that there is compliance 
with (he principles of fairness, COmpeLll1VeneSs and cost-effectiveness in 
section 21 7( I) of the ConsLitution. A conrexwal approach should thus be 
adopted by the cour(S when they are faced with debarment decisions. 
(c) The absence of waiver during the period of endorsement 
No provision IS made for the waiver of [he power of state organs [Q debar 
during the peflod of debarment (and [his also applies [Q debarment on the 
ground of unsa(]sfactory performance under a previous contract).o3 In light 
of (he argument made above (i,e that debarment should not be aimed a( 
punishing contractors but rather to protect the public purse). provision should 
be made for the possibility of waiver during the period of debarment 8~ 
Thus, provision could be made for waiver in excep(Jonal circumstances 
H2 UllIl,~d ~Ialcs I:AH. <J 10(J-1 (a) Sct' dbu ZtK.I(t'l (fll 74 d!JO\'C) 261 2b4. 
H3 See par 3,2 t sliwa. 
8,1 S(:c, tor (~xclll\ple. [lte i.JrlH(:d ':;ICclI('~ FAR, which Ilk!kt:~ prcJVI"IOJ\ fOI Ihb. Sl:C. HI 










































when a (new) contract may be awarded to a contractor even though it has 
been debarred from government contract awards. I( must be cautioned. 
however. that clear guidelines should be laid down in this regard. As is [he 
position in the United States, there should be 'compelling reasons' before 
a contract may be awarded to a debarred contractor.
1I5 
Examples of such 
'compelling reasons' may include national defence. urgency, the unique 
capability of a debarred contractor. or circumstances where 'failure (0 con-
tract with (he debarred or suspended contrac(Or would seriously harm [an 
organ of scare's] programs and prevent accomplishment of mission re-
quirements'. at 
(d) The position regarding subcontractors 
The Corruption Ac( and the Regulations Regarding (he Regis(er for Tender 
Defaulters do not expressly refer to the position regarding subcontractors 
in the procurement process. Should a main contractor, for example. be 
excluded if it proposes co make use of a debarred subcontractor? It is sub-
mitted (hat a main contractor should nO( be excluded from government 
contract awards on (he basis that its proposed subcontractor's particulars 
are endorsed on the Regis(er for Tender Defaulters. As noted by Shannon,81 
luJnless the subcontract requires government approval (some direct contact 
between the government and the affected concern), the party dealing with the 
government, rather that lsicJ the agency itself, should be responsible for the 
business integrity of any excluded subcomraccing party. Once che government 
has made a determination that an eligible firm IS responsible and worthy of ob-
raining a government contracc. no furrher concern about that firm's lower rier 
arrangements should remain At that poim, the [government] agency has no di-
rect relationship with the caimed parry. and arguably the government no longer 
needs rhe same level of protection thal il does when privity exists between the 
agency and the excluded person or firm. If the tainted party plays an excessive 
rote in the overall operation of the contract or program. however. the govern-
ment should exercise its discretion to decline to enter into the prime contracL
ll1I 
Thus, only if there will be direct contact between the government and the 
subcontractor, in the sense thar the proposed subcontract is subject to 
government consent, or the debarred subcontractor plays a dispropor-
tionate role in the overall operarion of the contract to be awarded, should 
(he main contractor be denied the contract on (he ground that it lacks the 
necessary abiliry to render performance under the contract. 89 
85 PAR 9.405(a) 
86 Kramer (fn 68 above) 541 -542 (foolnores omitted). See also Bednar (fn 17 above) 22B. 
who nmes [hat 'rolnce (he wrongdoing has been revealed and [he corporation is de-
barred. [he likelihood of immediarely repealed misconduct by the same corporation is 
remote. Al that pOint. there Simply are too many pressure poims for responSible con-
duct for lhe corporation lo ignore. Por example, the debarred corporation will be slrug· 
gling hard to prove tha( remedial and correclive action has been taken and rhe debar-
ment should be lifted'. 
B7 Shannon BO 'Oebannen[ and suspension revisiled. Pewer eggs In [he basket?' (1995) 
44 CatholIc University Law Revurw 161. '382 
88 Footnmes omirwd See also Uni(ed States FAR 9.405-2. 
89 See also Williams (fn 72 above) I 1-12· referring (0 Case C-5/97 Ballast Nedam Groep 










































THE EXCLUSION OF CONTRACTORS FROM GOVERNMENT CONTRACT AWARDS 
(e) Endorsement for conduct unrelated to public contracting 
The legislation regarding debarment on the ground of fraud or corrupLion 
makes provIsion only for condue[ related [Q public contracLing. Only it a 
contractor is convicted of an o~lence in relaLJon LO the government pro~ 
curement process maya court order the endorsement of the particulars of 
the offender on the Register for Tender Defaulters.
C
( It IS submitted that 
thought should perhaps be given to [he debarment of contracrors also for 
conduct unrelated to public contracting Debarment should be an option 
not only where a contractor has defrauded the government in the past, 
but also where [here is evidence [hat a contrac[Qr committed offences in 
relation to, for example, non-public contracts. As noted by Shaw,o, if a 
contracror is willing to defraud a non-government entity, it can be as~ 
sumed [hat it will treat government enWies similarly. 
Thus, the application of debarment on the ground of fraud or corruption 
in relation to only government contractlng can be said to be restricLive. It 
fails to take account of [he fan that unethical conduct in relation to non~ 
public contracLS also impacts negallvely on a contractor's responsibility in 
the performance of public contracts.~' Conduct that could, for example, 
render a convicLed contracLor eligible for endorsement on the Register for 
Tender Defaulters may, as is the case in the United States. include acts 
such as bribery, the mah.ing of raIse statements, the receipt or stolen 
property, and offences Indicating a lack of business integrity that directly 
and seriously arrects the responsibility or a contractor.
Q
·, 
(t) Endorsement of enterprises established in the future 
The Corrupuon Act and the Regulations Regarding the Register for Tender 
Defaulters should be commended for allowing [he endorsement of the 
particulars on [he RegisLer ror Tender Defaulters also or enterprises linked 
[Q the convicted enterprise and persons implicated by (he conviction. H An 
endorsemem on the Regiswr further applies, unless the court directs o[her~ 
Wise, LO every emerprise which will be established in the future and which 
will be wholly or panly controlled or owned by the convicted or endorsed 
person or enterprise." The Registrar is further required to endorse the 
Regisrer accordingly.% 
90 SUIIOII 2H( I ltd) ot lile <. orruptioll Au rdcrrtng 10 s,," j 2 and 13 dedlirtg wirl1 01 tl~lll'eS 
111 respecl of (OrrufJI auiVllles reldling to rOnLract~ dnd COl rup! acrivi(ies relalrng 10 the 
procurilig drld Vol il hdraWdl of [I' IIdcr~ 
<) 1 Fn 17 <lbove. 212. 
92 Bednar (tn 17 abOve) 226 227 
93 LJrrilcd S[dll~ F.\R 9.1\06-2 Sec; also FI\R 9 406-2(). Wlrl{ II nldk(:~ provbion tor debar-
IlIen( . orr any O( her CdUSC ot ~o ~(:nolls or COrTI f)(: II !fIg a nail Ire t hdl It d lleers [he pr(;~cn I 
rcspon':>lbillly ot the (ortlraC(or or ~ubcolllrauor' Sec rlHlher Bednar (fn 17 above) 226-
227 
<)4 St:CI ion~ 2H( 1)(1)) dnd 2H( 1 )(e) 01 lite Corrupu()fI At·t c!lld IkgLJldlions I (I )0) .-Hld I (I )(h) 
or r lit: H.CgllldII(HI':> Regard i ng 11i(' RegiS! cr for ·1 eJl(Je r lJt'tdull e rs Sec d bo U 1111 ed SI al e~ 
FAR l) 40(J-5. 











































In praC(ice. the enforcement of the above provisions may prove to be 
rather difficult. This will especially be the case with the endorsement of 
enterprises established in the future and which are owned or controlled by 
a convicted or endorsed person or enterprise. As a general rule. proper 
enforcement of the provisions will be possible only if the state is prepared 
and able to spend considerable amounts of money to investigate the 
ownership of enterprises wishing to do business with the state.'n There is, 
furthermore, no indication of how far into the future the endorsement is 
intended to apply to a future enterprise which will be wholly or partly 
controlled or owned by the convicted or endorsed person or enterprise. It 
has been correctly suggested9B that the endorsement of a future enterprise 
should take place only during the period of endorsement of the convicted 
or endorsed person or enterprise. It would be difficult to see the legal 
basis for the exclusion of a future enterprise beyond the endorsement 
period of the 'controlling' person or enterprise. 
4 DEBARMENT AND 'ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION' 
The debarment of a contractor has the potential to inflict grave harm.Q9 
Many contractors are substantially dependent on the government for 
business. A contractor's whole business may be with the government; its 
equipment may have been modified entirely to meet the needs of the 
government. The business of a contractor may also fall in an area of 
government control, for example, road construction. IOU Where a contrac-
tor's debarment or exclusion from government contract awards is the 
result or consequence of a conviC(ion for fraud or corruption in a court of 
law, there is generally no difficulty because the contractor will have been 
afforded an opportunity to be heard. The audi alteram partern rule would. 
in other words, have been complied with. Where. however. a decision is 
made to debar a Contractor in the absence of a conviction for fraud or 
corruption, the debarment decision should not be taken lightly. The same 
applies [0 the decision to debar a contractor for the failure to render 
satisfactory contractual performance in the past. 
97 In [he Unired Stares. il is esrima(Cd that II cosrs approximarely $2 000 LO Invesrigate a 
'rypical applicanl' ror a governmem comraci and appruximately $10000 in more com-
plex cases (Anectliarico r and Jacobs JB 'Purging corruplion from public contracring: 
rhe "solutions" are now pan of Ihe problem' (1995) 40 New York Law School Law Re-
view 143, 172 - referring to interviews conducted wilh Joseph DeLuca, Assislant [n-
spector General, New York City School Consrruction Authority, in New York, N.Y. on 
September I 5, 1999 and November 18, (991). See also Williams (fn 72 above) 12··15 
who generally deals wilh Ihe difficulries of excluding (debarring) 'relared' persons or 
enterprises from government contracr awards under European Communiry law. 
98 Williams (fn 72 ahove) 20 ·21. 
99 The deharmeru of a comracror can he equated with the remedies of dismissal and sus-
pension in tile labour law context. It is generally accepted that these remedies, particu-
larly dismissal. are (he ultimate form of workplace discipline. Various rules are therefure 
in place for the protecrion of employees. In rhls regard. see rhe Lahour Relations Ac( 66 
of 1995. See also Grogan J Dismissal (2002); Grogan J Workplace law 8 ed (2005) Pan 
C; Du Toit et at LabDur relatIOns law. A cDmprehensive guide 4 ed (2003) ch VIII. 










































THE EXCLUSION OF CONTRACTORS FROM GOVERNMENT CONTRACT AWAIl.DS 
In South Africa. the administra(ive law of judicial reVIew applies to gov-
ernment procurement procedures and decisions. defining the scope of the 
government '5 powers, rhe way In which such powers should be exercised 
and the consequences that flow from an abuse of powers.le'i In short, 
organs of state must act within the confines of [heir common law, consti-
tutional law and StiHutory powers; organs of state may not fetter the dis-
cretion afforded to them, and persons affected by administrative deci-
sions must be given an opportunity to be heard. In South Africa, these 
rules are generally regula[ed by Paja (i.e. the national legislation which, 
with the exception of sections 4 and 10, came into force on 29 November 
2000 to give effect to section 33 of lhe ConstitU[ion). Section 33 provides 
as follows: 
I . Everyone has the right [0 administrative action thar is lawful, reasonable 
and procedurally f;:m. 
2 Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative 
aCllon has the right to be given wriltcn reasons 
3. National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and 
must -
taj provide for the review of adminisrrauve action by a court or, where 
appropriate, an Independent and impartial tribunal. 
(b) Impose a duty on the srate to give effeCt [0 the righls In subsections 
(I) and (2): and 
(c) promote an effiCient administration lJ.' 
In bnef. Paja deals with ~eneral administrative law, as opposed to particu-
lar administrative law, IJJ laying down rules and principles that apply to 
and bind all levels of government (national, provincial and local). It applies 
to organs of state when '(i) exercising a power in terms of the Constitution 
or a provincial constitution; or (iL) exercising a publIC power or performing 
a publiC function in terms of any legislation'. L:l~ It further applies lO 'a nat-
ural or juristic person, other [han an organ of state, when exercising a 
public power or performing a public function in terms of an empowering 
101 On Ihe IdW or jlldlCldl review III SOUIII Alm'a, ,>cc g(~l\l!rdlly De VtlleJRjwilcw/ reVIfW (~I 
rlIiJnJnL\rrallVl' W'IIIJi1 In S()uth A/rim t'~O())), i-Io('xlcr C The new ('(Jnsll/wwnll/ & IlI/mlT!-
j,\trallvP low Vol 2 (2002). CUrrI'e I ami Kladwn J rhe Promotion 0/ AdlnJntstrtllive justice 
Au Lwnt'hL)()ok CWO I ): Wledwr~ M AlJminlstrrillve lliw ( 19R5) 
102 IJn[lIllli! nilliOIlJI legl~lalloll ret'errE'd 10 III '> 11(3) WdS tllC:lClcd. In mller words PaJa, the 
opera[lon ur ~ 33 Wel'> SlJ~p(:lI(k(l dJld !-. 24 oi the 1 g<n Con'-oIJIIHion drcuively re-
lTl.lirwd III dfer! llelll 23(L)(!) of S( hedule 6 01 (Ill! 1996 Con.'.[j[u(Jon proVided (ilal 
<; Y)( I) and ~ )1(2) IICld lO rt!(ld <1" follow", I'm lhe inlc'rim perilld:Lvery person hus the 
riyht /0 (II) lav .. :lill rldmlntslrrlllVI' !l({wn where any of their rlghlS ur /l1!1'res/s ;s 4fl'crl'il 
or /hrl'il/f'nf'd; (iJ) procedurallY.!I1I)' atlmlllis/mllve llct!IJn where any oj /hl'lr rlghlS or (c-
yl/;ma/(' expectatIOns i~ (~[jcc/ed or threatened. (C) be furnished with rea,~ons In wn/Jll9Ior 
adl1!lnls/ratlve al'fllm which ({{feas any o/' {heir nfJhts or lTlit'reSfS unless the reasons .for 
such IIc/JOn ha Vf' been Illiule puv/II'. I1lld (II) iii/mill/strewV€' Wi IOn whit'h is Jl1~{ !fiflble In re-
1m ion /Il the reasons yl Vf'l1 for it when' any of /hl'lr rights IS alfected or lhreil/ened' (em· 
pildSis origilldl) 
103 See I~axler l. Adllllrtl~t rdliv(~ law il Y81) 2, where [ilt..: au[ilor del irl(;~ pdrJi( lJlar eldIr\lni~­
tralive law CI!-. comprising 'thf' le9Is/(Jl/on !J()vemm9. !llld /(>!J111 pnn('/p/es and pO/lell's de-
veloped in re,~pl'('t (!f .<,pel'!/k areil.\ (!f ailnnnl,\lral/(J/j' (elllplldSis uriginal) nli!S(~ include, 
I nll~r alIa. g(lVt! rl H lH' III prllCi JrI~IllCIiI prlln'dlJres, IlqllO r IICCIlSlrlg and Hlll lllgriwon, 










































LAW, DeMOCRACY &,DEVELQPMENT 
provision, which adversely affects the rights of any person and which has 
a direct, external legal effect'. 105 Paja gives powers to the courts to scrutinise 
the lawfulness, reasonableness, procedural fairness and the right to written 
reasons for administrative action. It also provides for remedies that are 
available if these requirements are not complied with. It further provides for 
procedures and methods aimed at encouraging good decision making by 
organs of state, thereby aiming to reduce the need for judicial review. 
The right to just administrative action is therefore of supreme import, 
ance in South African administrative law. Where previously the couns had 
an inherent or common,law power to review administrative action, the 
review power of the courts is today subject to the Constitution and Paja, 11)6 
The precondition for recourse to judicial review under Paja, however, is 
'administrative action,;IO"l only if the action or decision complained of 
amounts to 'administrative action' can recourse be had to judicial re-
view.log 
The courts have held that the conduct of the government procurement 
process, the evaluation of tenders and the award of a tender to a success, 
ful tenderer are all forms of 'administrative action' within the meaning of 
section 33 of the Constitution and Paja.
109 
The decision to debar a contrac' 
tor can similarly be said [0 amount to 'administrative action' - the de, 
cision would, in accordance with Paja, 'adversely [affect] the rights fof the 
contractor]' and have 'a direct, external legal effect',"D A debarment de-
cision is accordingly subject to the requirements of lawfulness, reason, 
ableness and procedural fairness, III and a contractor is entitled to reasons 
105 Section I (b) of Paja. For actions and decIsions that are excluded from judicial review 
under Paja, .see the definition of 'administrative action' in s I of Paja 
106 The common-law power of review was described by Innes CJ in johannesburg Consol1~ 
dated Investment Co v johannesburg Town Council 1903 TS I I I, I 15 as follows. 'When-
ever a public body has a duty imposed on it by statute, and disregards important 
provisions of the statute, or is guillY of gross irregularity or clear Illegality III the per-
formance of the duty, this Coun may be asked to review [he proceedings complained 
of and set aside or correct (hem. This is no special machinery created by the Legisla-
ture; it is a righl inherent in the Coun'. 
107 'Admmistrative action' IS defined III s I of Paja. Currie and Klaaren (fn 101 above) par 
24 nore that the definition, as laid down in raja, IS unnecessarily complicated, To sim-
pliry the definition, the writers list seven elements that make up the definition of 'ad-
ministrative action', According to them, '[aldministrative action is' (I) a decision or a 
proposed decision; (2) of an administrative nature, (3) Ihat is made In terms of an em-
powering provision; (4) that is nor specifically excluded; (5) thai is made by an organ of 
slate or by a private person exercising public power; (6) that adversely affects rights 
and (7) Ihnt has a direct e)(ternal legal effect'. 
108 Hoc}(ter (fn 101 above) 91 refers to 'administrative action' as the 'gateway to Judicial 
review', 
109 See, inter alia, Umjolozl Transport (Edms) BpI? v Minister van Vervoer en andere (1997] 2 
All SA 548 (A) 552j-553a; ABBM Printing and Publishmg (Pey) Ltd v TransneC Ltd 1998 
(2) SA 109 (W) I I 7G-H; Nextcom (Ply) Ltd v Funde NO and others 2000 (4) SA 491 (T) 
504G- 1: Gnnaker LTA Ltd and another v Tender Board (Mpuma/anga) and others [2002) '3 
All SA 336 ('1') par 32; Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO and Others 2003 (2) SA 460 
(SCA) par 5. 
I 10 Section I (b). 










































TilE EXCLUSION OF CONTRACTORS FROM GOVERNMENT CONTRACT AWARDS 
for a debarmenl decl~lon.: I' A contractor who IS dlssa[isfled wIth the decision 
made ha~ locus standi [0 challenge [he deci~lon, by means of an appli-
cation for judicial review.' ~ A contractor is also enci[led [0 have access [0 
the necessary and relevant information from the organ of state to enable 
i( to enforce its right ro JUS( adminis[ratlve action.' I~ 
A contranor who has not been convicted in a court of law for fraud or 
corruption, or who has not been implicated or linked by a coun to rhe con-
victed enterpnse should, therefore. in principle receive adequate norice of 
an organ of state's imen[lon to debar i[, I' i[ should be afforded information 
In relallon [0 (he proposed decision, it should be afforded an opportunity 
[0 present argumenrs and evidence in response (0 the allega[ions against 
it' ," and It should he informed [ha[ it has the right to approach a court of 
law ror a review of [he decision I ; The same opportunities should be 
I 12 St;("(HlIl 11(2) 01 lile COIl~(llllIIO(l ,HId ~ ~ of Pajd For dtlalled examilldt.ioll of (lIe 
feqLJlrellH"lIl~ uf" lawtulness, rtasolldulelles~. procedural talrne~s dnd tht nghL Lo 
r,~cI~OII<i ['or adllllrlisl ra(IVc anion. SCI: Dc Ville: (Ih 101 abow') ch<i 1 6. Hoex(er (t'n 101 
above) (tis") 6. CUrrI(, cHid KICtarcn (III 101 rlbovc) ch<,"3 ~} 
I 11 Sec N(Jllona/ &. CiVl'r,V'lI,\ ,1.1odu/ar ('omlrW:/1On (Illy) /.til v 'lender /l()(mi. Free Stale 
f'roV/nc/(l1 Gmnnmenr 19<1') (I) SA 70 I (0) 70311 704J)/E. 
114 St'criun "32t1Ha) uf rile COrlSrirUlion and rhe PrulllOrlOn 01 Acn~~s [0 In[OrmeHion ACl 2 
01 2000 Oil I he riglll of rlCC('<,S 10 illlorll1<tt IIHI gellcrally. scc ClJrric I ,HId KlaClrcll J The 
Promotton (J/ Acce!!:' to In{orma/lOn Ac/ (.'OInl1ll'nlwy (2002) ~ee dbo (JllTlzale:, v Freeman 
334 I; 2d ~70 (0.<. .elL IQ(),1) :-)74 lIlt' CUIHI s!r('ssed [hal 'w say llial llierc is no 
"rlghr" (0 guverllllH'nr ("[Jlllf(l('[S does nO[ fesolve the question of jlls(irialJrlHY Of 
rOlUst: lht:n' i~ 110 sUl.h n!lhJ: bUI Illal C(trIrlOI IHean Ihal Ille goverrllllellr CCtIl ,KI Cirbi-
[rarily. eilller sllllsl<JlIllvely or proccdlHdlly, agdillsi d p(:r~o[\ or llla[ SlJ( h p(;r~()11 is nOI 
erlllllt;d 10 (hdllt':llgt" lhe pfUcesse~ drld tlie t"vldcllce lJdofe he is offiCially declared 111-
eligihle for govcrnfllcnl (on(rans' (crnphasi ... original) 
I I:, S/'t: Tmn.~o) Sen Lr/ly. ITII'. oj Ohio v Freeman h19 F 2ft 11 R (I C)H I) 121 Tilt: courl irr I his 
(else hC'lti Ilial '[litH! general IIOIICt: which appcll,HlIS ret (:IVt·(j did ntH p(:rrrli[ eldcquale 
prepdralioll for participation III a Illeanrngful way III any t'onIlCOJl1Hl!--( hearlllg or 
eqilivalell( proceedlllg Appdlanrs were suspelHje(j ('or. among orhp.r rhlnge;, "bllllllg 
irrt:glllilfHj(:S" Al Ille lillie lhls ill/ormdlion Wd~ received. appeJlams had perforrTlt:d d 
number of COllfract<; tor rilt: (]SA ovt:r <i('veral years al v,molls IOGtliorlS Appdlarlls were 
IIO( lold 10 wtuctJ 01 Ih('s(' COlllrac(S Ihe "billill!5 Irrt:glliarilies" rch:rrt·d. WillHlllt fiJrrller 
idelllityilig IlirurlllalJOll of al ledS! lire t (Jlllra( I Irlvolvt:d. and afJfJroxlllldle dille or 11I1!>IJili-
lng~,. Il would Ut; LlI best onerous and a( worst virtually ilnpo~sihlc [() dll~nivdy gctrhcr 
and prc<it'11I rt:lcv.HlI illfofllidl illli relulillg (hi ... gClwrCtj chClrgc·. Tilt.' COlin, In oillt'r words. 
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pullilc li-lw' i<iSllt!S ill govc:rrllH('l\1 liilhllily' paper prcserllt'd al 4111 /\nllilal Workshop 
~LF.r COllference. 4 May I ()9:) in ,r..klbolJrT\c and I 1 May Il)"~, in ~ydney on Gowrn" 
menl Liallilily !, .. sues In Pil/)i/(' /.aw, 2() .. ·3-1 dvadClhl(~ Ctl hup:/Iwww wenlwortl1r halTl-
bers ('0111 alJ/lllrlrollin!->oll/priv 111111 ( (Jl\tirmcd acces~' 2:) JdlllJilry 2(06); Seddon N 
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117 Set: UlIir(:d Slilies I;AI~ 9.406-3, wlli( II gell(!rdlly dedls widl [ile procedures for debdr-
mt;rll. More or Ic~~ sHl1dar ell'illt'lllefl(~ an' afforde(j 10 COrHracrors who tace deudf-
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afforded to comractors who face debarment on the ground of unsa[isfac-
(Qry contractual performance in the past. Affording contractors [he above-
mentioned opportunities may. admittedly. give rise to costS in [he form of 
time and resources and general disruption of an organ of state's adminis-
trative processes. Such costS can. however, be said to be a necessary 
expenditure to ensure compliance with the principles contained in sec-
tion 217(1) of the Constitution, and also section 33 of the Constitution and 
Paja. 
5 CONCLUSION 
In light of, in particular, the principles of fairness, competitiveness and 
cost-effectiveness in section 217( I) of the Constitution, it is important, as 
far as possible, for organs of state to, attract the maximum number of 
contractors (Q participate in government procurement procedures. The 
relevant principles in section 217( I) will not be complied with if organs of 
state are able (Q exclude contractors from participation based on some of 
[he current legislative provisions. I[ is important for legislation at national 
and provincial government level, for example. (Q allow [he exclusion of 
contractors only for 'willful' non-performance or unsatisfactory perform-
ance under a previous government contract. As is the case at local gov-
ernment level, non-performance or unsatisfactory performance under a 
previous contract must also have occurred during [he preceding five years. 
The legislation dealing with debarment for fraud or corruption has a 
number of shoncomings. Most impOrtantly, the Regula[ions Regarding [he 
Register for Tender Defaulters makes provision for a debarment period of 
20 years. This is unreasonably long and is in direct conflict with the 
Corruption Acr. 11R Provision should be made for a debarment period of five 
years. This will be in line with the underlying policy of debarment (i.e. 
that debarment is nor aimed a[ the punishment of contrac(Qrs but at the 
protection of the state against unerhical contractors). The blacklisting of 
convicted persons or enterprises on [he Register for Tender Defaulters is, 
furthermore, within the discretion of the courts, but no gUidance is pro-
Vided on the fac(Qrs that the courts should take account of when exercis-
ing such discretion. It is submitted rhar [he public interest should guide 
the couns in exercising their discretion. Provision should also be made for 
the waiver of the power of organs of state to debar during the period of 
debarment. It is important, however. for clear gUidelines to be provided in 
this regard. An organ of state should. for example. be able to award a 
contract to a debarred contractor only if, as is the case in the United 
States. there are 'compelling reasons' for doing so. 
It is furthermore submitted that where a main contrac(Qr wants (Q 
make use of a debarred subcontractor. the main contractor should be 
denied the contract only if there wiJI be direct contact between the state 
organ and the subcontractor, or if the debarred subcontractor will play 
a disproportionate role in the overall operation of [he contract to be 
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C TI-IE EXCl USION OF CONTRACTORS FROM COVERNMFNT CONTRACT AWARDS 
awarded. In such mstances, the contran can be denied on the ground that 
the main contrac[Or lacks the necessary capacity to render performance 
under the contracl. Ir is also important for thought to be given to the 
debarment of contrac[Ors for conduct unrelated to public comracting. 
The decision to dehar furthermore amounts to 'administrarive action' 
withm the meaning of section 33 of [he Constitution and Paja.. Thus, a 
contractor who has not heen convicted in a coun of law for fraud or cor~ 
rUp[IOn, or who has not been implicated or linked by a coun to the con-
victed enterprise IS entitled to a deharment deCIsIOn thar complies with 
the requirements of lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness. It 
is also entitled to reasons for a debarment decision and has locus standi LO 
challenge (he decision by means of an applica(ion for judicial review. 
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